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Califano P. Aznavorian: Social Security Residence
Requirement Does Not Impair the Right of
International Travel
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court, in Cakfano v. Aznavorian,'
upheld the constitutionality of section 1611 (f) of the Social Security Act,2
which denies Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits to a recipient
for any entire month during which he is outside the United States.3 De-
ciding that section 1611 (0 of the Act rested on a rational basis, the
Supreme Court ruled that the provision did not impermissibly infringe
upon the freedom of international travel. 4 Under the Court's analysis, a
statute which impinges on the right to international travel need only pass
the scrutiny of the "rational relationship" test, rather than the more
stringent scrutiny of the "fair and substantial relationship" test.5
Grace Aznavorian, an American citizen, was a resident of California
in 1974 and a recipient of SSI benefits. 6 On July 21, 1974, she left the
United States for a trip to Mexico and, due to unexpected illness, did not
return until September 1, 1974. Denied SSI benefits for the months of
August and September, 7 Ms. Aznavorian sought administrative remedies
but was unsuccessful.8 She then filed suit on behalf of herself and all
similarly situated persons in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California,9 asserting that the denial of payments by
1 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1382(o (1976).
3 Id.
4 439 U.S. at 175.
5 Id. at 176-77.
6 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976) contains the requirements an individual must meet to be eligi-
ble for SSI benefits. An individual who does not have an eligible spouse must not have an
income exceeding $1,752 for the calendar year 1974 or any year thereafter. Id. § 1382(a)(1)(A).
The recipient's resources may not exceed $2,250 in the case of an individual who has a spouse
with whom he is living, or $1,500 where there is no spouse. Id. § 1382(a)(1)(B).
7 The challenged section reads:
IN]o individual shall be considered an eligible individual for purposes of this sub-
chapter for any month during all of which such individual is outside the United
States. . . . For purposes of the preceding sentence, after an individual has been
outside the United States for any period of 30 consecutive days, he shall be
treated as remaining outside the United States until he has been in the United
States for a period of 30 consecutive days.
Id. § 1382(o. Thus, section 1611(f) operates to deprive an SSI recipient of benefits not only for
the time that the recipient is absent from the United States, but also for thirty days after the
recipient's return to the United States.
8 439 U.S. at 172.
9 Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
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Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Joseph Califano, deprived
her and the class of equal protection, due process, and the right of inter-
national travel as guaranteed by the fifth amendment.' 0  Ms.
Aznavorian requested declaratory relief and her withheld benefits.
The district court reasoned that, because international travel is a
basic constitutional right, the statute must bear a fair and substantial
relationship to the purpose it seeks to achieve." The court concluded
that the limitations on benefits contained in section 1611 (f) were not sub-
stantially related to its objective of confining payments to bona fide resi-
dents of the United States and granted summary judgment to the
plaintiff class.12 The court noted that the provision creates a conclusive
presumption of abandonment of residency for any departure from the
country lasting a month or longer which causes an individual travelling
outside of the United States for the prescribed period to lose SSI benefits
regardless of intent to maintain residency. 13 Legitimate reasons for re-
maining outside of the United States for over thirty days, such as busi-
ness purposes, ill health, or the existence of other evidence that residency
was not in fact abandoned, are not taken into consideration.14 Secretary
of HEW Califano appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court,
contending that section 1611 (f) did not violate the fifth amendment be-
cause it rested on a rational basis. 15 In reversing the lower court deci-
sion, the Supreme Court concluded that the provision need only pass the
rational basis test and not the more exacting fair and substantial rela-
tionship test. 16
In support of its decision the Court noted that the rational basis test
had consistently been used in the past to determine the constitutionality
of welfare legislation. 17 In Dandridge v. Williams','8 the Supreme Court
recognized that a state does not violate the equal protection clause sim-
ply because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.19 A classi-
fication having a reasonable basis will be respected although it is "not
made with mathematical nicety or . . .results in some inequality. ' '20
The Court in Dandridge held that a Maryland regulation providing a ceil-
10 Id. at 791. The class action was allowed by the district court but was limited to those
individuals who had received an explicit decision denying, interrupting, or terminating their
benefits based solely on the terms of the challenged statute. Id. at 792-93.
11 Id. at 797.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 795.
14 Id.
15 439 U.S. at 174. Appeal was taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976), which allows any
party to appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order
of any court of the United States holding an act of Congress unconstitutional in any suit to
which the United States or any of its officers or employees is a party.
16 439 U.S. at 178.
17 Id. at 174.
18 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
19 Id. at 485.
20 Id. (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
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ing of $250 per month under the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren program (AFDC), regardless of family size or actual need, did not
violate the equal protection clause. 2 ' The Court found it unnecessary to
explore all of the reasons advanced in justification of the regulation; 22 the
conclusion that it was free from invidious discrimination was sufficient to
uphold its constitutionality. 23 Although the Dandidge Court noted that
the administration of public welfare assistance involves the most basic
economic needs of the poor, it refused to apply a strict scrutiny test and
concluded that the proper test was one of reasonableness. 24 The Court
limited its own power by recognizing that the myriad social and eco-
nomic problems presented by the task of allocating limited funds to a
large number of potential recipients should not be the business of the
Supreme Court.
25
The Supreme Court has continued to uphold the rational basis test
in cases involving challenges to welfare legislation. Injefferson v. Hack-
h ,26 a decision by the state of Texas to provide somewhat lower welfare
benefits for AFDC recipients than for the aged or infirm who were in
other categories was held not to be invidious or irrational.27 As long as
its judgments are rational, wrote Justice Rehnquist, "the legislature's ef-
forts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a
constitutional straitjacket."' 28  Legislation adopted to improve the gen-
eral welfare is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.
29
The discretion to make decisions regarding the distribution of funds be-
longs to Congress unless its determination is plainly arbitrary.
30
Another Supreme Court decision reiterating the idea that social wel-
fare legislation will be measured by the rational basis test is Mathews v.
Lucas.3i At issue was the provision of the Social Security Act condition-
ing the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for insurance benefits
upon a showing that the deceased wage earner was the claimant child's
21 397 U.S. at 486.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 487.
24 Id. at 485. The strict scrutiny test requires the government to show it is pursuing a
"compelling interest . . .one whose value is so great that it justifies the limitation of a funda-
mental constitutional value." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 524 (1978).
25 397 U.S. at 487.
26 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
27 Id. at 549.
28 Id. at 549-50. The Court concluded that there was no constitutional or statutory re-
quirement that relief categories be treated exactly alike. Id. at 549.
29 Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976). In Malhtws, a provision of the Social
Security Act granting benefits to a married woman with a dependent child in her care whose
husband retires or becomes disabled, while denying the same to a divorced woman, was found
to have rested on a rational basis. d. at 189.
30 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). A Social Security Act provision granting
benefits to persons who reach the age of 65 was found to be valid as long as it was not arbitrary.
When money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare is shaped by Con-
gress. d. at 645.
31 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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parent and, at the time of his death, was living with the child or contrib-
uting to his support.32 The mother of two illegitimate children by the
deceased filed suit on the ground that the denial of benefits where pater-
nity was clear violated the equal protection clause because other chil-
dren, including all legitimate children, were entitled by statute to
benefits without proof of actual dependency. 33 The Supreme Court re-
jected this argument and held that the challenged statutory classification
was reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death.
34
While not disputing that the rational relationship test is generally
the appropriate one for determining the constitutionality of welfare legis-
lation, Ms. Aznavorian argued that section 1611() should nevertheless
be judged by the more stringent substantial relationship test because it
interfered with freedom of international travel. 35 A right to interna-
tional travel has been recognized by the Supreme Court in at least three
decisions. In Kent v. Dulles,36 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress
had not given the Secretary of State the discretion to deny passports to
an individual because he was a Communist or was suspected of going
abroad to further Communist causes. 37 The right to travel was found to
be part of the "liberty" of which a citizen may not be deprived without
due process of law. 38 Where activities natural and necessary to the well-
being of the citizen are involved, the Court will narrowly construe all
delegated powers which seek to curtail them. 39 The Kent Court, how-
ever, did not decide issues of constitutionality; it merely concluded that
the Secretary did not have the discretion to curtail the free movement of
citizens in order to satisfy himself about their beliefs or associations.
40
The freedom of international travel was also recognized by the
Court in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,4 1 which involved the revocation of
passports under section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950.42 This section made it unlawful for a member of a registered Com-
munist organization to apply for or use a passport. 43 An irrebutable pre-
sumption was established that individuals who are members of certain
32 Id. at 497-98. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1976).
33 427 U.S. at 502.
34 Id. at 509. For other decisions illustrating the Supreme Court's traditional application
of the rational basis test to welfare legislation, see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971) (provision of Social Security Act requiring reduction in benefits to reflect workmen's com-
pensation payments rests upon rational basis); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (termina-
tion of dependent child's social security benefits upon child's marriage as mandated by the Act
rested upon reasonable assumption that a married person is less likely to depend on parents for
support).
35 439 U.S. at 175.
36 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
37 Id. at 129-30.
38 Id. at 125. See also Note, The Right to Travel-Its Protection and Apptcatn Under the Consti
tuton, 40 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 66 (1971).
39 357 U.S. at 129.
4o Id. at 130.
41 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
42 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-798 (1976).
43 Id. § 785(a).
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organizations will, if granted passports, engage in activities endangering
the security of the nation.4 4 Factors such as individual knowledge and
the purpose of the trip were ignored. 45 The Court stated that
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamen-
tal personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgement must be veiwed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
4 6
The Aptheker Court concluded that the statute too broadly and indis-
criminately restricted the right to travel and therefore constituted a de-
nial of liberty rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment. 47
Zemel v. Rusk48 involved the validity of a regulation of the Secretary
of State prohibiting the validation of passports of United States citizens
for travel to Cuba.49 Although the Court restated the position taken in
Kent that the right of international travel cannot be taken away without
due process of law, it nevertheless concluded that "the fact that a liberty
cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that it can
under no circumstances be inhibited ' '50 and, accordingly, upheld the de-
nial of the passport. 5 1 Zemel had applied for a passport after the United
States had broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba in order to satisfy
his curiosity about the state of affairs there.52 Unlike the passport refusal
involved in Kent, Zemel's request was refused because of foreign policy
considerations affecting all citizens rather than because of his political
beliefs or associations.53
Ms. Aznavorian argued that this freedom of international travel was
basically equivalent to the constitutional right to interstate travel 54 and
therefore deserving of the higher level of protection from infringement
provided by review under the substantial relationship test. The Supreme
Court, however, found that while it had recognized the importance of
the right to international travel it had never granted such right the
higher degree of constitutional protection accorded the right of interstate
travel. 55 Instead, the Court noted that its decisions had recognized a
distinction between the right of international travel and the right of in-
44 378 U.S. at 511.
45 Id. at 514.
46 Id. at 508 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). , Shelton involved a
state law requiring teachers to file an affadavit each year, as a condition of employment, listing
every organization to which the teacher belonged. The Supreme Court held that the statute
worked a deprivation of freedom of association protected by the due process clause. Id. at 490).
47 378 U.S. at 505.
48 381 U.S. 1 (1965). See Note, Trawvlandihe Fiset Amendment: Zmelv. Rusk, 13 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 470 (1966).
49 381 U.S. at 3.
50 Id. at 14.
51 Id. at 15.
52 Id. at 4.
53 Id. at 13.
54 439 U.S. at 176.
55 Id.
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terstate travel .56
Freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been rec-
ognized as a basic right under the Constitution 57 and worthy of consider-
ation under the strict scrutiny test. In Shapiro v. Thompson ,5 the Supreme
Court had before it a fact pattern in the context of interstate travel simi-
lar to that in Aznavorian. The validity of state and federal provisions de-
nying welfare benefits to individuals who had resided in the
administering jurisdictions for less than a year was challenged. The
Court held that imposition of the durational residency requirements for
the purpose of inhibiting migration of indigents into a state was an un-
constitutional restriction of the right to travel and created an invidious
discrimination that denied equal protection. 59 As Justice Stewart noted
in his concurring opinion, the right of interstate travel is not a mere con-
ditional liberty subject to regulation under conventional due process or
equal protection standards; it is a virtually unconditional personal right
guaranteed by the Constitution. 60 The Court concluded that less drastic
means were available to minimize the risks of fraudulent collection of
benefits. 61  Where a fundamental right such as travel is at stake, the
Court will require the government to show a compelling interest to up-
hold the validity of legislation which seeks to dilute that right.62 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated that the right of international
travel is subject to less protection than the right of interstate travel.6 3
Thus, on similar facts, where the right of interstate travel is implicated,
the Court requires a showing of a compelling state interest to uphold the
legislation, while the right of international travel is not accorded this
same treatment.
Another recent Supreme Court case illustrating the Court's unwill-
ingness to subject the validity of legislation interfering with the freedom
56 Id.
57 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). Early cases found that the right to
interstate travel was grounded upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 283, 492 (1849).
58 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For more discussion of Shapiro, see Note, Durational Residence Re-
quinements fom Shapiro through Sosna: The Right to Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 622
(1975); Note, Shapiro D. Thompson.- Travel, Welfare, and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 989
(1969).
59 394 U.S. at 627, 629.
60 Id. at 642-43 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 637.
62 Id. at 638. The Court also stated:
This court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our
constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free
to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes,
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.
d. at 629.
63 Id. at 643 & n. 1 (Stewart, J., concurring). Relying on Kent, Aptheker, and Dulles, Justice
Stewart considered the right of international travel to be no more than an aspect of the "lib-
erty" protected by the due process clause and thus subject to regulation within the bounds of
due process. Id.
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of international travel to the same tests applied to restrictions on the
right of interstate travel is Calfano v. Torres.64 In that case, the Court
held that a provision which denied SSI benefits during any month a per-
son was outside the United States, defining "United States" as the fifty
states and the District of Columbia, was not an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with the right to travel. 65 Again, as in Kent, the Court noted that,
although the right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified, "the 'right'
of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect
of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause . . . . As such this
'right' . . . can be regulated within the bounds of due process."' 66
The Aznavortan Court distinguished the decisions in Kent. Aptheker,
and Zemel on the ground that unlike the provisions involved in those
cases, the challenged legislation in Aznavorian only incidentally affected
the freedom of international travel. 67 Section 1611 (f) "does not limit the
availability or validity of passports. It does not limit the right to travel
on grounds that may be in tension with the first amendment. It merely
withdraws a governmental benefit during and shortly after an extended
absence from this country."'68 Therefore, despite its effect on interna-
tional travel, the Court found a rational basis sufficient to uphold its
constitutionality. 69
In determining that the denial of SSI benefits does not offend the
liberty to travel abroad, the Court followed the established notion that a
classification made by Congress involving welfare legislation need only
rest upon a rational basis. 70 The Court failed, however, to address the
arguments of the district court in support of its decision that the chal-
lenged statute should be subjected to the more stringent fair and substan-
tial relationship test. 71 The district court relied on Reed v. Reed,72 which
involved the validity of a state probate law giving a mandatory prefer-
ence to males over females and thus allowing a probate court no discre-
tion in the appointment of administrators. 73 The Reed Court held that
the statute must bear a fair and substantial relationship to the purposes it
64 435 U.S. 1 (1978). For other decisions concerning the deference given the right to inter-
state travel, see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (Arizona statute
requiring one year's residence in a county as a condition to receiving non-emergency medical
care at the county's expense was held to impinge upon the right of interstate travel by denying
newcomers the basic necessities of life); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)(absent a com-
pelling state interest, Tennessee may not burden the right to travel by penalizing those bona
fide residents in the exercise of their voting rights by virtue of their changing jurisdictions).
65 435 U.S. at 4. Se 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(), 1382c(e) (1976).
66 435 U.S. at 4 n.6.
67 439 U.S. at 177.
6 Id.
69 Id. Cf. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 58 (1977)(although the statute may incidentally
affect an individual's decision to marry by terminating benefits, the Court nevertheless upheld
its validity).
70 See text accompanying notes 17-34 supra.
71 Se 440 F. Supp. at 797.
72 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
73 Id. at 74.
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seeks to achieve and that the probate provision failed to meet this test. 74
Reed established a "middle ground" standard of review for gender-based
classifications, falling somewhere between the rational basis and strict
scrutiny levels of review. 75
Under the traditional rational basis test, legislation will almost
never be invalidated because the classification itself will always suggest a
mixture of goals to which the classification is reasonably related. 76 The
requirement that legislative classifications have a fair and substantial re-
lationship to legitimate governmental purposes would prevent the Court
from "exercising its imagination in developing conceivable purposes for
the classification or in imagining facts which would sustain the classifica-
tion's rationality. '77 The degree of fundamentality of the rights affected
or the invidiousness of the classification determine the willingness of the
Court to apply a stricter test. 78 The stronger the individual interests in
relation to the state's interests, the more rigid the requirement that the
means be substantially related to the ends. 79 As the individual interests
become less important or the state interests more overriding, the require-
ment of precision becomes less strict.8 0 To determine if this proposed
means of scrutiny would have led to a different result in Caifano v.
Aznavorian, the freedom of international travel must be more closely ex-
amined to see how important a right it is in fact and whether the Court
passed too quickly over the significance of the right in reaching its result.
Freedom to travel at home and abroad without unreasonable gov-
ernmental restriction is a basic constitutional right of every American."'
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General
Assembly and approved by the United States in 1948, states in article 13:
74 Id. at 76.
75 440 F. Supp. at 797 n.9. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court." A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972).
76 Bice, Standards ofJudicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 700 (1977).
77 Coven & Fersh,-Equal Protection, Social Welfare Litigatin, The Burger Court, 51 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 873, 879-80 (1976).
78 Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Forward Waier of Constitutional Rights. Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63 (1970). Furthermore:
The requisite level of precision is uncertain, and may indeed vary according to
the invidiousness of the classification or the importance of the personal interests
infringed . . . . In effect, then, active review comprehends two levels of balanc-
ing. At the first level, the court will inquire whether the importance of the per-
sonal interests involved is so great as to outweigh the state's interest in being free
to accomplish its objectives through rough accomodations, rather than with scien-
tific precision. But even if the state classifies precisely, the court will inquire fur-
ther whether the state interests advanced by the classification are sufficient to
outweigh the injury done to the individual by the particular unequal treatment to
which he is subjected.
Id. at 63-64.
79 Id.
80 Coven & Fersh, supra note 77, at 883.
81 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912 (9th Cir. 1973).
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(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country.
82
Freedom to leave the country has always been a valuable asset enjoyed
by citizens of the United States.83 One authority asserts: "Our nation
has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful con-
duct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do
what he pleases, go where he pleases."'8 4 This freedom to travel outside
the country, however, has always been subject to more restrictions than
travel within the United States. With the passage of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952,85 the President was granted the authority to
impose restrictions on the entry and departure of citizens to and from the
United States without a passport.8 6 In times of war or national emer-
gency, additional restrictions are authorized.8 7 Passports may be re-
stricted for travel to a country with which the United States is at war,
where hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the
public health or physical safety of U.S. travellers.88 Therefore, although
the freedom of international travel is indeed an important one, state in-
terests may outweigh the encroachment on the individual's liberty.
In Aznavorian, the goals of the challenged statute appear to be legiti-
mate and justified. Although some inequalities may arise, the scope of
welfare assistance is so extensive that generalizations must be employed
to make the system workable. Section 1611 (f) serves to assure that an
individual's residence is genuine by denying SSI benefits until one has
been back in the country for thirty days.89 The Aznavorian Court noted
that the longer an individual is out of the country, the greater the likeli-
hood that he is no longer a resident. 90 Residency requirements may also
be justified on the basis of budgetary and recordkeeping considerations. 9 1
The lower court recognized that objective factors such as continued
home ownership or rental, continued employment in the United States,
and local organizational memberships could be more effective and realis-
tic indicators of one's residence. 92 The Supreme Court, however, focused
82 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A181 1,
at 31 (1948).
83 Z. CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 196 (1956).
84 Id. at 197.
85 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
6 Id. § 215(b) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (Supp. III 1979).
87 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (Supp. III 1979).
88 Id.
89 439 U.S. at 178.
90 Id.
91 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975). In Sosna, the Court upheld an Iowa statute
requiring one year residency before filing a petition for divorce. Id. at 406-07. The district
court in Aznavorian distinguished Sosma on the ground that ,osna only delayed the right to di-
vorce or remarry rather than penalizing that right. 440 F. Supp. at 800.
92 440 F. Supp. at 798.
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on the difficulty of monitoring the continuing eligibility of citizens
abroad and the probable intent of Congress that these payments should
be limited to those who need them in the United States in reaching its
conclusion that the statute had a rational basis.93 The Supreme Court
also noted that the statute was not based on travel; it only incidentally
affected the exercise of that freedom.
94
Given section 161 l(O's incidental effect on international travel and
the greater degree of restrictions historically placed on that freedom, the
Supreme Court had sufficient grounds for its decision to uphold the pro-
vision. The importance of the governmental goals furthered by section
1611() outweighed the burden engendered by the classification. The
Court's holding, however, should not be read as establishing a lesser stan-
dard for review of welfare legislation than the rational relationship test.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Marshall and Brennan expressed their
concern that language in the majority opinion in Aznavorian could be
interpreted as establishing such a lesser standard.95 The Court had
stated that "[u]nless the limitation imposed by Congress is wholly irra-
tional, it is constitutional despite its incidental effect on international
travel." 96 The broad scope of welfare legislation and its value to those
individuals whose lives depend upon the social welfare system, however,
require that any decision affecting a recipient's interests be judged by the
rational relationship test rather than by some lesser standard.
-MARY IRELAND SPARROW
93 439 U.S. at 178.
94 Id. at 177.
95 Id. at 178-79 (Marshall, J. & Brennan, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
